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Nosocomial infectionThe outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 was the ﬁrst emergence of an impor-
tant human pathogen in the 21st century. Responding to the epidemic provided clinicians with extensive
experience in diagnosing and treating a novel respiratory viral disease. In this article, we review the expe-
rience of the SARS epidemic, focusing on measures taken to identify and isolate patients, prevent the
transmission of infection to healthcare workers and develop effective therapies. Lessons learned from
the SARS epidemic will be especially important in responding to the current emergence of another highly
pathogenic human coronavirus, the agent of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and to the
recently emerging H7N9 inﬂuenza A virus in China. This paper forms part of a symposium in Antiviral
Research on ‘‘From SARS to MERS: 10 years of research on highly pathogenic human coronaviruses.’’
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It has been 10 years since the outbreak of severe acute respira-
tory syndrome (SARS) caused by a novel coronavirus which was
subsequently named SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) (Peiris et al.,
2003b). SARS-CoV is phylogenetically diverged from other known
coronaviruses associated with human infections including human
coronavirus (HCoV)-OC43, HCoV-229E, HCoV-NL63 and Middle
East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), but closelyrelated to the civet and the bat SARS-CoVs, a group of lineage B
betacoronaviruses found in civets, raccoon dogs, ferret badgers
and Chinese horseshoe bats (Rhinolophus sinicus) in Guangdong
Province of South China (Chan et al., 2013c) The Chinese horseshoe
bat appears to be the natural reservoir of the ancestral SARS-CoV,
because the Ka/Ks ratios (rate of nonsynonymous mutation/rate
of synonymous mutation) of the S, orf3a, and nsp3 genes were
low, while those of the civet strains in both the 2003 and the minor
2004 outbreaks were high, suggesting a rapidly evolving process of
gene adaptation in the animals (Lau et al., 2005b; Li et al., 2005a).
SARS emerged as an outbreak of atypical acute, community-
acquired pneumonia in late 2002. The initial cases were animal
handlers in Guangzhou Province having regular contact with wild
game food animals, suggesting that civets could serve as an
Table 1
Clinical features of probable and laboratory-conﬁrmed cases of SARS, Cases in Asia
include 1693 reported from Beijing, 575 from Hong Kong, 190 from Guangzhou, 159
from Taiwan, 118 from Singapore and 62 from Vietnam, of which 606 (21.7%) were
healthcare workers. Cases in North America include 168 reported from Canada, of
which 87 (51.8%) were healthcare workers. NM, not mentioned. References for SARS
in Asia are (Chen et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2006; Hsu et al., 2003; Jang et al., 2004; Lee
et al., 2003; Liang et al., 2004; Peiris et al., 2003a; Peiris et al., 2003b; Rainer et al.,
2003; So et al., 2003; Tsang et al., 2003a; Tsang et al., 2003b; Vu et al., 2004; Yeh et al.,
2005; Zhao et al., 2003). References for SARS in North America are (Avendano et al.,
2003; Booth et al., 2003; Poutanen et al., 2003).
Clinical symptom Number/total (% with sign or symptom)
SARS in Asia
(n = 2797)
SARS in North America
(n = 168)
Fever 2708/2797 (96.8%) 130/168 (77.4%)
Chills 554/934 (59.3%) NM
Rigors 411/804 (51.1%) NM
Cough 1373/2797 (49.1%) 116/168 (69.0%)
Sore throat 85/445 (19.1%) 21/154 (13.6%)
Rhinorrhea 65/492 (13.2%) 3/144 (2.1%)
Headache 335/822 (40.8%) 61/168 (36.3%)
Dizziness 201/753 (26.7%) 6/144 (4.2%)
Dyspnea 460/2477 (18.6%) 68/154 (44.2%)
Chest pain or tightness 404/2208 (18.3%) 18/154 (11.7%)
Fatigue or malaise 437/653 (66.9%) 60/168 (35.7%)
Nausea or vomiting 79/564 (14.0%) 32/168 (19.0%)
Diarrhea 349/2725 (12.8%) 39/168 (23.2%)
Myalgia 459/944 (48.6%) 84/168 (50.0%)
Arthralgia NM 15/144 (10.4%)
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household and hospital contacts. The human SARS-CoV subse-
quently evolved and was capable of person-to-person transmis-
sion. The epidemic was rapidly and globally disseminated when
a medical professor from a teaching hospital in Guangzhou, who
was considered as a ‘‘super-spreader’’ of SARS, came to Hong Kong
on 21 February 2003. During his stay in hotel M, he transmitted the
infection to other residents, and the secondary cases spread the
disease to hospitals in Hong Kong, and to other countries including
Vietnam, Singapore, and Canada. Eventually, a total of 8096 pa-
tients were infected in over 30 countries among 5 continents and
774 (9.5%) of them died (Cheng et al., 2007a).
As there were no known effective antiviral agents for SARS, sup-
portive care and the use of broad-spectrum antibiotics to cover
secondary bacterial infection were the key treatment regimen.
The use of existing antiviral therapies including conventional ones
like ribavirin, interferon alpha (Infacon), and convalescent plasma,
or those with inhibitory effects on SARS-CoV such as lopinavir/
ritonavir, with or without corticosteroid use has been reported in
non-randomized clinical trials (Cheng et al., 2004b). Since the clin-
ical efﬁcacy of these antiviral agents were found to be uncertain in
retrospective analysis (Leong et al., 2004), effective public health
and infection control measures including contact tracing and quar-
antine of close contacts played an important role in preventing fur-
ther transmission of SARS in the communities and hospitals (Pang
et al., 2003; Svoboda et al., 2004).
International collaboration, uniting laboratories with different
technologies and capacities, allowed research laboratories to rap-
idly fulﬁll all postulates for establishing SARS-CoV as the cause of
SARS. The epidemic came to an end when there was no further
transmission of SARS in Taiwan on 5 July 2003 (Cheng et al.,
2007a). However, there was a brief reemergence (Che et al.,
2006), from accidental laboratory exposures in Singapore, Taiwan,
and Beijing, and from recurrent animal-to-human transmissions in
Guangzhou in late 2003 and early 2004 (Liang et al., 2004; Lim
et al., 2004; Normile, 2004a, b), which posed a potential threat to
public health.2. Clinical features
The incubation period of SARS is generally 2–14 days with occa-
sional cases of up to 21 days in a family cohort in Hong Kong (Chan
et al., 2004c). Most patients were admitted to hospitals 3–5 days
after onset of symptoms (Donnelly et al., 2003). The typical clinical
presentation includes fever, chills, rigors, cough, headache, myal-
gia, fatigue and malaise, whereas sore throat, rhinorrhea, dizziness,
and chest pain are less frequently seen (Table 1). However, symp-
toms may be milder in children, and an atypical presentation with-
out fever may occur in elderly patients (Chow et al., 2004; Fisher
et al., 2003; Kwan et al., 2004) but rarely in healthy young adults
(Woo et al., 2004). Diarrhea at presentation occurred in 12.8%
and 23.2% of patients in Asia and North America respectively, but
in up to 73% of patients after a mean of 7.5 days after onset of
symptoms in a community cohort (Peiris et al., 2003a), which
was positively correlated with a higher mean viral load in nasopha-
ryngeal specimens (Cheng et al., 2004a).
Higher initial viral load is independently associated with worse
prognosis in SARS (Chu et al., 2004c). Rapid respiratory deteriora-
tion was observed one week after the onset of illness, with 20%
of patients progressing to acute respiratory distress syndrome
(ARDS) which required mechanical ventilation (Peiris et al.,
2003a). The radiographic features of SARS were similar to viral
pneumonia, but ground-glass opacities and focal consolidations
as demonstrated in chest radiographs predominantly involved
the peripheral and subpleural regions of the lower zones (Grinblatet al., 2003; Hsieh et al., 2004; Lai et al., 2005a). Spontaneous pneu-
momediastium was found in about 12% of cases (Chu et al., 2004b),
whereas 26% of patients developed barotrauma during mechanical
ventilation (Gomersall et al., 2004).
In addition to upper and lower respiratory tract disease, extra-
pulmonary manifestations were also reported for SARS. These in-
cluded liver and renal impairment (Chau et al., 2004; Chu et al.,
2005c), bradycardia and hypotension due to diastolic cardiac dys-
function (Li et al., 2003), pulmonary arterial thrombosis (Ng et al.,
2005), rhabdomyolysis (Wang et al., 2003b), neuromuscular disor-
der (Tsai et al., 2004), and an acute neurological syndrome with
status epilepticus (Lau et al., 2004d). Lymphopenia, leucopenia,
thrombocytopenia were commonly observed (Lee et al., 2003).3. Diagnosis of SARS
The diagnostic criteria for SARS were based on a list of clinical
features suggested by the World Health Organization (WHO) and
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) during the
initial phase of the epidemic. According to the WHO criteria, a sus-
pected case was deﬁned as a person presenting after 1 November
2002 who had a history of fever >38 C, with cough or difﬁculty
breathing, and had close contact with a person who was a sus-
pected or probable case of SARS, or had a history of traveling to
or residing in an area with transmission of SARS within 10 days be-
fore the onset of symptoms. In addition, a person with an unex-
plained acute respiratory illness resulting in death, with
epidemiological exposure similar to that described above, but on
whom no autopsy was performed, also fulﬁlled the clinical criteria
of suspected SARS.
A probable case of SARS was deﬁned as a suspected case with
chest X-ray evidence of inﬁltrates consistent with pneumonia or
acute respiratory distress syndrome, with a positive test result
for SARS-CoV by one or more laboratory diagnostic assays, and/or
with autopsy ﬁndings consistent with the pathology of ARDS, with-
out an identiﬁable cause (WHO, 2003b). The overall accuracy of the
WHO guidelines for identifying suspected SARS was found to be
83% with an negative predictive value of 86% (Rainer et al., 2003).
V.C.C. Cheng et al. / Antiviral Research 100 (2013) 407–419 409A laboratory case deﬁnition for the diagnosis of a re-emergence
of SARS was set up by the WHO after the epidemic. A person with
clinically suggestive symptoms and signs and with one or more po-
sitive laboratory ﬁndings including
1. Reverse transcriptase- polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)
positive for SARS-CoV, using a validated method from at
least two different clinical specimens or the same clinical
specimen collected on two or more occasions during the
course of illness, or two different assays against different
gene targets, or repeated RT-PCR using a new RNA extract
from the original clinical sample on each occasion of testing;
2. seroconversion by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
(ELISA) or indirect ﬂuorescent antibody (IFA) assay; or
3. isolation in cell culture of SARS-CoV from any specimen and
with RT-PCR conﬁrmation using a validated method (WHO,
2003a).
The CDC case deﬁnition of SARS was also based on a combina-
tion of clinical, epidemiological and laboratory criteria, with exclu-
sion criteria for cases in which an alternative diagnosis could fully
explain the illness, or the convalescent phase serum sample ob-
tained >28 days after symptom onset was negative for antibody
to SARS-CoV, or the case was reported on the basis of contact with
an index patient who was subsequently excluded as a case, provid-
ing other possible epidemiological exposure criteria were not
available (CDC, 2003).
Rapid laboratory diagnosis mostly relied on nucleic acid ampliﬁ-
cation assays, using the SARS-CoV open reading frame 1b or nucleo-
protein gene as targets in the detection of respiratory specimens,
stool, urine, blood, and lung tissue (Chan et al., 2004b; Lau et al.,
2005a; Poon et al., 2003; Poon et al., 2004; Poon et al., 2005b). Diag-
nosis rarely relied on enzyme immunoassay (EIA) for viral nucleo-
capsid protein antigen detection on patients’ sera (Che et al.,
2004a; Che et al., 2004b; Lau et al., 2004c). The nucleoprotein (NP)
gene and proteinwere chosen as targets for RT-PCR and EIA because
NP is the most abundantly expressed mRNA and protein in the in-
fected cells, and should therefore give a higher sensitivity. Real-time
quantitative RT-PCR of nasopharyngeal aspirates was found to have
a sensitivity of 80%, even if the specimen was collected within the
ﬁrst 5 days of symptom onset (Poon et al., 2004).Table 2
Medical treatment of SARS in adult and pediatric patients. Patients in Asia include 1119 fr
Patients in North America include 179 patients from Toronto.
Regimens (references)
Initial therapy with antiviral and / or immunomodulationa
Ribavirin (Avendano et al., 2003; Bitnun et al., 2003; Chiu et al., 2003; Hsu et al., 2003
2003)
Ribavirin and corticosteroid with or without pulse steroid at clinical deterioration (Ave
Choi et al., 2003; Ho et al., 2003b; Hon et al., 2003; Lau et al., 2004a; Peiris et al.,
2004; Tsang et al., 2003a; Tsang et al., 2003b; Wang et al., 2004a)
Lopinavir/ritonavir, ribavirin, and corticosteroid (Chan et al., 2003; Chu et al., 2004a)
Corticosteroid alone (Chen et al., 2006; Loutfy et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2004a)
Interferon and corticosteroid (Loutfy et al., 2003; Zhao et al., 2003)
Recombinant interferon alpha (Zhao et al., 2003)
Rescue therapy with antiviral and / or immunomodulation
Lopinavir/ritonavir (Chan et al., 2003)
Convalescent plasma (Cheng et al., 2005)
Immunoglobulin (Lew et al., 2003; Lin et al., 2003)
Pentaglobulin (Ho et al., 2004)
Integration of Chinese and western medicine (Lin et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2012)
a In addition to the empirical antibacterial agents and oseltamivir.
b Including 4 pediatric cases.
c Including 10 pediatric cases.
d Including 23 pediatric cases.
e 41 of 44 reported cases were also reported by (Chu et al., 2004a).The shedding of virus correlated with the clinical course. Among
14 SARS patients with serial collection of nasopharyngeal aspirates
on days 5, 10 and 15 after symptom onset, viral loads peaked on
around day 10, with an inverted V pattern (Peiris et al., 2003a). In
additional to respiratory and stool samples (Cheng et al., 2004a),
quantitative measurement of viral loads were also performed on
other specimens including serum, urine, and saliva (Hung et al.,
2009;Wanget al., 2004b). Detection of virus byRT-PCR couldpersist
for up to 51 days in lung tissue (Farcas et al., 2005).4. Treatment
Because no therapy was proven effective in randomized control
trials, supportive treatment played an important role in the treat-
ment of SARS. Since the etiological agent of SARS was unknown
during the initial phase of the epidemic, patients were given
empirical antibiotics for the treatment of community-acquired
pneumonia, with coverage of both typical and atypical bacterial
pathogens (So et al., 2003). Broad-spectrum antibiotics were indi-
cated in patients who developed nosocomial bacteremia, catheter-
related sepsis, and nosocomial pneumonia due to Escherichia coli,
Klebsiella pneumoniae, and Stenotrophomonas maltophilia (Peiris
et al., 2003a). Effective antiviral agents are needed to control viral
replication, and hence inﬂammation and tissue damage, as the
high viral load was positively correlated with the development of
organ failure and death in a subsequent study (Hung et al.,
2009). Before the identiﬁcation of SARS-CoV as the etiological
agent of SARS, the neuraminidase inhibitor oseltamivir was also
prescribed to some patients in Toronto and Singapore which obvi-
ously was unlikely to affect the prognosis (Booth et al., 2003; Hsu
et al., 2003; Poutanen et al., 2003).
Another broad spectrum antiviral agent, ribavirin, a purine
nucleoside analogue that inhibits guanosine triphosphate synthe-
sis and viral RNA polymerase activity, was commonly given to pa-
tients in Asia and North America. Of 2546 patients with
descriptions of medical treatment for SARS reported in the litera-
ture, 1316 (51.7%) of them received ribavirin, either as the primary
treatment regimen or in combination with a corticosteroid or other
antiviral agent such as lopinavir/ritonavir (Table 2). The regimens
of ribavirin included:om mainland China, 1059 from Hong Kong, 111 from Singapore, and 78 from Taiwan.
Asia
(N=2367)
North
America
(N = 179)
; Leong et al., 2004; Poutanen et al., 2003; Zhao et al., 155b 21c
ndano et al., 2003; Booth et al., 2003; Chiu et al., 2003;
2003a; Peiris et al., 2003b; So et al., 2003; Sung et al.,
960d 136
e 44 0
404 13
105 9
30 0
31 0
83 0
93 0
12 0
450 0
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 intravenous formulation of 8 mg/kg every 8 h for 5 days,
followed by oral formulation of 1200 mg every 8 h, for a
total of 10–14 days;
 intravenous loading dose of 2 g, followed by intravenous
formulation of 1 g every 6 h for 4 days, then 500 mg every
8 h for 3 days; or
 oral formulation of 2.4 g for one dose, followed by 1.2 g
every 8 h for 12 days (Booth et al., 2003; Peiris et al.,
2003a; Sung et al., 2004).
However, the role of ribavirin remained uncertain, as there was
no obvious clinical beneﬁt in a retrospective, uncontrolled cohort
analysis involving 229 patients in Singapore (Leong et al., 2004).
Although in vitro studies also demonstrated that ribavirin had
no signiﬁcant activity against SARS-CoV in Vero cells (Cinatl
et al., 2003), ribavirin had good activity when it was tested in hu-
man Caco-2 and pig kidney cell lines (Morgenstern et al., 2005).
Moreover, ribavirin was shown to be synergistic with interferon
in in vitro combination assays (Chen et al., 2004). The low level
of in vitro activity against SARS-CoV might be attributed to cellular
toxicity, as the 50% cytotoxic dose of ribavirin on various cell lines
has been reported to be approximately 200–1000 lg/mL (Tan et al.,
2004). Adverse effects of ribavirin were not uncommon. In a cohort
of 110 patients in Toronto, dose-related hemolytic anemia was ob-
served in 61% of patients, whereas hypocalcaemia and hypomag-
nesaemia was reported in 58% and 46% respectively (Knowles
et al., 2003). In another cohort of 44 patients in Taiwan, 73% of pa-
tients had a drop in hemoglobin level 3 days after therapy with
ribavirin which was found to be an independent prognostic factor
of hypoxemia or mortality (Chiou et al., 2005).
Some patients were treated with a boosted HIV protease inhib-
itor, with a combination of lopinavir and ritonavir as either initial
therapy or rescue therapy along with ribavirin in the evolving epi-
demic (Chan et al., 2003; Chu et al., 2004a). In vitro antiviral sus-
ceptibility testing showed that the cytopathic effect of SARS-CoV
was inhibited by lopinavir at 4 lg/ml and ribavirin at 50 lg/ml
after 48 h of incubation. Inhibition of the cytopathic effect was
achieved down to a lopinavir concentration 1 lg/ml combined
with ribavirin 6.25 lg/ml, only when the viral inoculum was re-
duced to 50 TCID50 or below, suggesting potential synergistic activ-
ity (Chu et al., 2004a). The addition of lopinavir/ritonavir as initial
treatment was associated with a reduction in the overall death rate
(2.3%) and intubation rate (0%), when compared with a matched
cohort who received standard treatment with ribavirin (15.6%
and 11.0% respectively, P < 0.05). However, the use of lopinavir/
ritonavir as rescue therapy showed no difference in the overall
death rate or in rates of oxygen desaturation and intubation, com-
pared with the matched cohort in subgroup analysis (Chan et al.,
2003). In view of the weak antiviral activity of protease inhibitors,
further studies should be done to ascertain whether the clinical
beneﬁt could be attributed to their anti-apoptotic rather than their
antiviral activity (Matarrese et al., 2003).
In the early phase of the SARS epidemic, before the identiﬁca-
tion of the causative agent, histopathological changes in open lung
biopsy specimens suggested the possibility of immunopathological
damage (Nicholls et al., 2003). Immunomodulators including corti-
costeroid, convalescent plasma, and pentaglobulin were therefore
empirically used as initial and rescue treatment. As initial therapy,
a corticosteroid without antiviral therapy was initiated in 417
(16.4%) of 2546 patients (Chen et al., 2006; Loutfy et al., 2003;
Wang et al., 2004a), while recombinant interferon-alpha was given
to 30 (1.2%) (Zhao et al., 2003) and a combination of corticosteroid
and interferon was given in 114 (4.5%) (Loutfy et al., 2003; Zhao
et al., 2003).In a preliminary uncontrolled study of 24 patients in Toronto,
13 patients were treated with corticosteroid alone and 9 patients
were treated with corticosteroid and interferon alfacon-1. Among
the corticosteroid group, 5 (38.5%) required intensive care, 3 re-
quired mechanical ventilation, and one died, while there was no
mortality among the corticosteroid plus interferon alfacon-1 group
and only 3 and 1 patient required intensive care and mechanical
ventilation respectively. In addition, the combination of corticoste-
roid and interferon alfacon-1 appeared to result in improvements
in oxygenation requirement and faster resolution of chest radio-
graph abnormalities (Loutfy et al., 2003). However, in vitro suscep-
tibility testing of interferons against SARS-CoV showed
inconsistent results for interferon-ß1a and interferon-a2b (Cinatl
et al., 2003; Hensley et al., 2004; Stroher et al., 2004), although
inhibition of cytopathic effects of SARS-CoV in culture was ob-
served for interferon-ß, interferon-an1, interferon-an3, and leuko-
cytic interferon-a (Tan et al., 2004). Treatment with both
interferon-ß and interferon-c synergistically inhibited SARS-CoV
plaque formation by 30-fold and replication by 3000-fold at 24 h,
and by more than 105-fold at 48 and 72 h post-infection in Vero
E6 cells (Sainz et al., 2004). Prophylactic treatment of SARS-CoV-in-
fected macaques with pegylated interferon-alpha reduced viral
replication and excretion, and viral antigen expression by type 1
pneumocytes (Haagmans et al., 2004).
Before the longitudinal serial viral load proﬁle of SARS-CoV dur-
ing the course of infection was known, corticosteroid therapy was
often used together with ribavirin. Without the availability of
extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO), pulse steroid was
also given as rescue therapy if patients had clinical deterioration
with increasing shortness of breath, oxygen desaturation, and
radiological worsening despite ventilator support (Peiris et al.,
2003a). Various regimens of corticosteroid therapy were used
(Sung et al., 2004; Tsang et al., 2003a), but a standard treatment
protocol for adult SARS patients, comprising a tailing dose of intra-
venous methylprednisolone from 1 mg/kg every 8 h to oral pred-
nisolone 0.25 mg/kg throughout a course of 21 days was
proposed (So et al., 2003). A retrospective analysis of 72 SARS pa-
tients showed that among 17 patients who initially received a
pulse dose of methylprednisolone of P500 mg/day had a lower
oxygen requirement and better radiographic outcome, when com-
pared with another 55 patients who initially received non-pulse
doses of methylprednisolone of <500 mg/day, even though the
cumulative steroid dosage, intensive care unit admission, mechan-
ical ventilation, mortality rates, hematologic and biochemical
parameters were similar in both groups after 21 days (Ho et al.,
2003b). In a retrospective analysis in Guangzhou, corticosteroid
treatment was shown to lower the overall mortality and shorten
hospitalization stay in the critically ill SARS patients (Chen et al.,
2006).
However, short- and long-term complications such as dissem-
inated fungal infection and avascular necrosis of bone associated
with prolonged high-dose corticosteroid use in the treatment of
SARS were frequently reported in both adults and children (Chan
et al., 2004a; Hong and Du, 2004; Wang et al., 2003a). In a longi-
tudinal follow up of 71 patients (mainly healthcare workers) who
had been treated with corticosteroid, 39% developed avascular
necrosis of the hips within 3–4 months after starting treatment,
and 58% of 71 patients had avascular necrosis after 3 years of fol-
low up (Lv et al., 2009). The number of osteonecrotic lesions was
directly related to the dosage of corticosteroid, and a peak dose of
more than 200 mg or a cumulative methylprednisolone- equiva-
lent dose of more than 4000 mg were signiﬁcant risk factors for
multifocal osteonecrosis, with both epiphyseal and diaphyseal le-
sions (Zhang et al., 2008). Up to this stage, no randomized control
trial data on the use of steroid was available, and therefore such
V.C.C. Cheng et al. / Antiviral Research 100 (2013) 407–419 411treatment should not be recommended, especially when ECMO is
available.
Because a neutralizing antibody response was consistently re-
ported in patients recovering from SARS (Chan et al., 2005), conva-
lescent plasma collected from these patients may be useful for the
treatment of severely ill patients. Among 80 SARS patients who had
received convalescent plasma in Hong Kong, a higher day-22
discharge rate was observed in patients treated before day 14 of
illness (58.3% vs 15.6%; P < 0.001) and in patients with positive
RT-PCR and SARS-CoV antibodies at the time of plasma infusion
(66.7% vs 20%; P = 0.001) (Cheng et al., 2005). Three healthcare
workers received convalescent plasma therapy in Taiwan. The viral
load of blood samples dropped from 4.9–6.5  105 copies/mL to
undetectable levels one day after transfusion (Yeh et al., 2005).
Pentaglobin, an IgM-enriched immunoglobulin preparation,
was given to 12 severely ill SARS patients who continued to dete-
riorate despite corticosteroid and ribavirin therapy. There was sig-
niﬁcant improvement in radiographic scores and oxygen
requirement after commencement of pentaglobin treatment, and
10 patients made an uneventful recovery (Ho et al., 2004). There
were no reported adverse events attributable to pentaglobin
administration, compared with the use of high-dose intravenous
gamma globulin (0.4 g/kg/day for 3 consecutive days), which
may be associated with deep venous thrombosis and pulmonary
embolism (Lew et al., 2003). Thymic peptides and recombinant hu-
man thymus protein were also given to a few patients, with uncer-
tain clinical beneﬁt (Zhao et al., 2003).
Traditional Chinese medications were used in the treatment of
SARS in mainland China. Except for glycyrrhizin, an active compo-
nent of liquorice roots, which was shown to have in vitro activity
against SARS-CoV (Chen et al., 2004; Cinatl et al., 2003), other reg-
imens of Chinese medicine were not independently assessed
in vitro. Nevertheless, 450 (17.7%) of 2546 patients were given Chi-
nese medicine as adjunctive therapy during the epidemic in main-
land China (Table 2). In general, Chinese medicines were used to
modulate or restore the immune system and to eliminate the toxin
as a result of SARS, but without randomized control trial data, it
was difﬁcult to assess their efﬁcacies, especially when heteroge-
neous mixtures of different components of Chinese medicine were
used (Lin et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2012).5. Risk factors for transmission
Like most other respiratory virus infections, SARS is predomi-
nantly transmitted by respiratory droplets, direct contact with
infectious secretions or contact with contaminated fomites. In view
of the super-spreading phenomenon from an index patient in Hong
Kong leading to the global dissemination of SARS, airborne trans-
mission of SARS-CoVwas considered possible under special circum-
stances (Chu et al., 2005a; Roy andMilton, 2004). Numerous studies
were done to identify potential risk factors for transmission in com-
munity and hospital settings (Tables 3A–C). In a case-control study
conducted in Beijing to investigate the risk factors for community
transmission among persons without known contact with SARS pa-
tients, it was found that consistent wearing of a mask outdoors was
associated with a 70% risk reduction, compared to not wearing a
mask, while consistently washing hands after returning home
showed a smaller risk reduction (Wu et al., 2004a). These ﬁndings
suggest that basic infection control measures with good hand hy-
giene practice can reduce the risk of community transmission.
For nosocomial transmission or outbreaks of SARS, most risk
factor studies performed during or after the epidemic emphasized
the importance of the appropriate use of surgical mask or an N95
respirator. Consistently wearing a surgical mask or respirator while
caring for patients was protective for the nurses who worked intwo critical care units in Toronto (Loeb et al., 2004). Mask wearing
was shown to be protective in multivariate analysis in a case-
control study conducted in a teaching hospital in Hong Kong (Seto
et al., 2003). The risk of developing SARS was 12.6 times higher for
those who did not wear a mask during patient care (Nishiyama
et al., 2008). Because of the physical stability of SARS-CoV, it can
survive for 4 days in diarrheal stool samples with an alkaline pH,
and it can remain infectious in respiratory specimens for over
7 days at room temperature (Lai et al., 2005b). Contact with respi-
ratory secretions was a signiﬁcant risk factor for SARS transmission
(Teleman et al., 2004). Exposure to body ﬂuids of healthcare work-
ers’ eyes and mucous membranes was also associated with an in-
creased risk of transmission (Raboud et al., 2010). Inconsistent
use of goggles, gowns, gloves, and caps was associated with a high-
er risk of infection (Lau et al., 2004b).
Performing high-risk patient care procedures such as intuba-
tion, manual ventilation, chest physiotherapy, suctioning, use of bi-
level positive airway pressure, high-ﬂow mechanical ventilation,
and nebulizer therapy had been associated with nosocomial trans-
mission of SARS among 17 healthcare workers in Toronto (Ofner-
Agostini et al., 2006). In particular, endotracheal intubation was a
high-risk procedure which deserved further investigation. A case-
control study conducted in Guangzhou showed that the incidence
of SARS among healthcare workers was signiﬁcantly associated
with performing endotracheal intubations for SARS patients with
an odds ratio of 2.76 (Chen et al., 2009).
In a retrospective cohort study to identify risk factors for SARS
transmission among 122 critical care unit staff at risk, 8 of 10 in-
fected healthcare workers had either assisted or performed intuba-
tion, resulting in a relative risk of 13.29 with 95% conﬁdence
interval of 2.99 to 59.04. It was also interesting to note that the rel-
ative risk may be higher for nurses than physicians. This might be
explained by the longer duration of exposure that nurses likely had
in the peri-intubation period, whereas physician exposure was of-
ten limited to the procedure itself (Fowler et al., 2004). In fact,
proximity and duration of contact with SARS patients may be asso-
ciated with a higher risk of viral transmission. Transmission of
SARS also occurred in 3 of 5 persons present during the endotra-
cheal intubation, including one who wore gloves, gown, and an
N95 respirator (Scales et al., 2003).
Aerosol-generating procedures may also contribute to the
transmission of SARS. Infection occurred in a healthcare worker
who assisted patients ventilated by a bag-valve-mask for 10 to
15 min before the intubation procedure during cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, despite having worn an N95 respirator (Christian
et al., 2004). The mechanism of transmission remains to be eluci-
dated. However, transmission of SARS-CoV by indirect contact with
contaminated environment might be one of the possibilities, as
SARS-CoV can survive in the environment for 72–120 h (Chan
et al., 2011; Duan et al., 2003), while infectivity is retained for up
to 6 days on a dried surface (Rabenau et al., 2005).
Hospital design with augmented air changes may be protective
against nosocomial transmission of SARS. In Hanoi, Vietnam, there
was no transmission in a hospital with designated isolation wards
of large spacious rooms with high ceilings and ceiling fans that
were kept running while the large windows were kept open for
natural ventilation (Le et al., 2004). The infection rate of SARS
among healthcare workers also correlated with the ratios of the
area of the ventilation windows to the area of the room. The great-
est transmission was in the ward with the smallest area of 61.9 m2
and no window, resulting in 52 (73%) of healthcare workers
becoming infected after caring for one SARS patient. In contrast,
in the ward with the highest ratio of ventilation windows to the
area of the room up to 1:40 (m2/m2), only 5 (1.7%) healthcare
workers wre infected after exposure to 96 SARS patients during
the study period (Jiang et al., 2003).
Table 3A
Analysis of risk factors and infection control interventions in relation to transmission of SARS in Hong Kong and China.
City or
country
Study design and setting Major ﬁndings References
Hong Kong Case-control (13 vs 241) study to identify risk factors for
nosocomial transmission among HCWs a hospital
Usage of mask (either surgical or N95 respirator) was shown to be
protective in multivariate analysis (p = 0.011)
(Seto et al.,
2003)
Hong Kong Case-control (72 vs 144) study to identify risk factors for
nosocomial transmission among HCWs in 5 hospitals
Inconsistent use of goggles, gowns, gloves, and caps was associated
with a higher risk for SARS infection (unadjusted OR 2.42 to 20.54,
p < 0.05)
(Lau et al.,
2004b)
Hong Kong Retrospective cohort study to identify risk factors for
nosocomial transmission among 66 Medical students at risk
Visiting index case’s cubicle had 7-fold increased risk than those who
did not (10/27 [41%] versus 1/20 [5%], RR 7.4; 95% CI 1.0 to 53.3),
when mask or glove were not available in the initial phase of
outbreak
(Wong et al.,
2004)
Hong Kong Retrospective descriptive study of 40 infected HCWs in a
community hospital
All infected workers had used surgical masks or N95 respirators.
Some had used gloves (58%), gowns (55%), and eye shields (28%), and
73% regularly washed their hands. Three cleaners had no direct
patient contact, suggestive of possible environmental contamination
(Ho et al.,
2003a)
Hong Kong Retrospective studies to evaluate the effectiveness of a triage
policy and risk-stratiﬁed infection control measures in a
tertiary paediatric & neonatal centres
Stringent infection control precautions, appropriate triage and
prompt isolation of potential SARS patients may have contributed to a
lack of nosocomial spread and HCW acquisition of SARS
(Leung et al.,
2004; Ng
et al., 2005)
Beijing Case-control study (147 vs 296) to identify risk factors for
nosocomial transmission among HCWs
Use of double exposure suits (OR = 0.053), education (OR = 0.072),
gloves (OR = 0.102), hands sterilized by iodine (OR = 0.231), room air
ventilation (OR = 0.32), were signiﬁcantly protective; conversely,
tracheal intubation (OR = 30.793) was a signiﬁcant risk factor in
multivariate analysis
(Pei et al.,
2006)
Beijing Case-control study (94 vs 281) to identify risk factors for
community transmission of SARS
Always wearing a mask when going out was associated with a 70%
reduction in risk compared with never wearing a mask. Always
washed hands after returning home showed smaller reduction in risk
(Wu et al.,
2004a)
Guangzhou Case-control study (91 vs 657) to identify risk factors for
nosocomial transmission among HCWs
Incidence of SARS among HCWs was signiﬁcantly associated with
performing tracheal intubations for SARS patients, OR 2.76, 95%CI,
1.16 to 6.53, p < 0.05
(Chen et al.,
2009)
Guangzhou Retrospectively studied the ventilation of wards and
nosocomial transmission of SARS
Among 4 types of isolation wards, when the ratios of the area of the
ventilation windows to the volume of the room were 0, 0, 1:95, and
1:40, and the total time of hospitalization were 43, 168, 110, and
1272 h, the infection rates of the HCWs in the areas mentioned above
were 73.2%, 32.1%, 27.5% and 1.7%, respectively
(Jiang et al.,
2003)
HCWs, healthcare workers; OR, odd ratio; RR, relative risk; 95% CI, 95% conﬁdence interval.
Table 3B
Analysis of risk factors and infection control interventions in relation to transmission of SARS in Vietnam, Singapore, and Taiwan.
City or
country
Study design and setting Major ﬁndings References
Vietnam Case-control study (43 vs 103) to identify risk factors for nosocomial
transmission among HCWs in a hospital
Risk of developing SARS is 12.6 times higher in those who did not
wear a mask.
(Nishiyama
et al., 2008)
Vietnam Retrospective descriptive study to identify the attack rate of SARS
among 193 HCWs at risk in a hospital
The highest SARS attack rates occurred among nurses who worked
in the outpatient and inpatient general wards (57.1%, 47.4%,
respectively). Nurses assigned to the operating room/intensive care
unit, experienced the lowest attack rates (7.1%) among all clinical
staff
(Reynolds
et al., 2006)
Vietnam Case-control study (28 vs 98) to identify risk factors for nosocomial
transmission among HCWs in Hanoi French Hospital
Masks (OR 0.3; 95% CI, 0.1 to 0.7) and gowns (OR 0.2; 95% CI, 0.0 to
0.8) appeared to prevent SARS transmission
(Nishiura
et al., 2005)
Vietnam Retrospective descriptive study to demonstrate lack of SARS
transmission among 62 HCWs at risk in hospital B
Hospital B had designated SARS isolation wards and large spacious
rooms with high ceilings and ceiling fans and large windows kept
open for cross-ventilation
(Le et al.,
2004)
Singapore Case-control study (36 vs 50) to identify risk factors for nosocomial
transmission among HCWs in Tan Tock Seng Hospital
Contact with respiratory secretions (adjusted OR 21.8, 95% CI, 1.7 to
274.8, P = 0.017) was signiﬁcant risk factor, whereas hand washing
(adjusted OR 0.07, 95% CI, 0.008 to 0.66, P = 0.02) and wearing of
N95 respirators (adjusted OR 0.1, 95% CI, 0.02 to 0.86, P = 0.04)
remained strongly protective by multivariate analysis
(Teleman
et al., 2004)
Kaohsiung Integrated infection control strategy involving triaging patients
using barriers, zones of risk, and extensive installation of alcohol
dispensers for glove-on hand rubbing in a study hospital in
Kaohsiung, Taiwan
Two HCWs contracted SARS in the study hospital (0.03 cases/bed)
compared with 93 HCWs in the 86 Taiwan hospitals that did not use
the integrated infection control strategy (0.13 cases/bed) during the
same three-week period
(Yen et al.,
2006)
Taipei Retrospectively studied the serial infection control measures to
determine factors most effective in preventing nosocomial
infections of HCWs in Taiwan
Checkpoint alcohol dispensers for glove-on hand rubbing between
zones of risk, and fever screening at the fever screen station outside
the emergency department were the signiﬁcant methods effectively
minimizing nosocomial SARS infection of HCWs (P < 0.05)
(Yen et al.,
2011)
HCWs, healthcare workers; OR, odd ratio; 95% CI, 95% conﬁdence interval.
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Numerous nosocomial outbreaks were reported in Toronto,
Hong Kong, Guangzhou, Kaohsiung, Singapore, and Vietnam duringthe SARS epidemic (Tables 4A–C). As a result of the admission of
infected index patients, there were a total of 716 secondary and
tertiary cases, among whom 410 (52.3%) were healthcare workers.
In an outbreak in an intensive care unit, 7 (10.1%) of 69 exposed
Table 3C
Analysis of risk factors and infection control interventions in relation to transmission of SARS in Canada.
City Study design and setting Major ﬁndings References
Toronto Retrospective cohort study to identify risk factors for nosocomial
transmission among 43 nurses who worked in two critical care units
with SARS patients
Eight (25%) of 32 nurses who entered a SARS patient’s room were
infected. The probability of SARS infection was 6% per shift
worked. Consistently wearing a mask (either surgical or N95)
while caring for a SARS patient was protective for the nurses
(Loeb et al.,
2004)
Toronto Case series to describe the possible route of infection among 17
infected HCWs from 6 hospitals
Performance of high-risk patient care procedures, inconsistent
use of personal protective equipment, fatigue, and lack of
adequate infection control training were likely responsible for
SARS infection
(Ofner-
Agostini
et al., 2006)
Toronto Retrospective cohort study to identify intubation as a speciﬁc risk
factor for SARS transmission among 624 HCWs caring 45 SARS
patients
Presence in the room during ﬁberoptic intubation (OR = 2.79,
p = 0.04), and HCW’s eyes & mucous membranes exposure to
body ﬂuids was associated with increased risk of transmission in
multivariate analysis (OR = 7.34, p = 0 .001)
(Raboud
et al., 2010)
Toronto Retrospective cohort study to identify intubation as a speciﬁc risk
factor for SARS transmission among 122 critical care staff at risk
Ten (8.2%) (5 critical care nurses, 2 respiratory therapists, and 3
physicians) had probable SARS. Performing endotracheal
intubation (RR, 13.29; 95% CI, 2.99 to 59.04; p = 0.003), had an
increased risk
(Fowler
et al., 2004)
Toronto Retrospective cohort study to identify intubation as a speciﬁc risk
factor for SARS transmission among 64 HCWs in ICU at risk
SARS occurred in 3 of 5 persons present during the endotracheal
intubation, including one who wore gloves, gown, and N95
respirator
(Scales et al.,
2003)
Toronto Case series to describe the possible transmission of SARS among 9
HCWs at risk during CPR
All healthcare workers adopted contact and droplet precautions.
One (11.1%) conﬁrmed to be infected. Ventilated with a bag-
valve-mask that may have contributed to aerosolization of SARS-
CoV
(Christian
et al., 2004)
Toronto Report of nosocomial outbreak control of 128 probable and suspect
cases of SARS, including 47 (36.7%) HCWs
Outbreak was under control when contact and droplet
precautions were implemented throughout the hospital on March
25, 2003
(Varia et al.,
2003)
Ontario Case series to identify NIPP & nebulized medication as a speciﬁc risk
factor for SARS transmission among 10 infected HCWs
9 HCW had unprotected exposure to the index patient. (Dwosh
et al., 2003)
CPR, cardiopulmonary resuscitation; HCWs, healthcare workers; ICU, intensive care unit; NIPP, non-invasive positive pressure ventilation; OR, odd ratio; RR, relative risk; 95%
CI, 95% conﬁdence interval.
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spreading phenomenon was described in the earliest nosocomial
outbreak in Guangzhou, in which an index patient directly or indi-
rectly transmitted the infection to over 80 healthcare workers
within 2 days of hospitalization (Wu et al., 2004b). A delay in rec-
ognition of symptomatic patients and inappropriate infection con-
trol measures were the most important reasons for nosocomial
outbreaks. Among outbreaks with detailed descriptions, the med-
ian time between the admission of the index patient and patient
isolation in a designated SARS ward was 4.5 days, with a range of
1–13 days (Dwosh et al., 2003; Gopalakrishna et al., 2004; Liu
et al., 2006; Nishiura et al., 2005; Scales et al., 2003; Teleman
et al., 2004; Wu et al., 2004b), especially longer patients without
an epidemiological link with a SARS contact (Wong et al., 2005).
Once nosocomial outbreaks were recognized, enhanced infec-
tion control measures were implemented in the hospitals. Because
the mode of transmission was not fully understood in the initial
phase of the SARS epidemic, infection control measures varied
from center to center, depending on the availability of resources
and administrative support. In a private hospital with less than
60 beds in Hanoi, Vietnam, SARS patients were cohorted with the
use of barrier precautions. N95 respirators, goggles, and face
shields were not available until 6 days after the outbreak (Reynolds
et al., 2006). In contrast, in a tertiary hospital with 1400 beds in
Singapore, N95 respirators, gloves, gowns, and goggles were imme-
diately provided to healthcare workers working in emergency
room, intensive care unit, and isolation ward, whereas powered
air puriﬁed respirators were available for high-risk procedures
such as intubation (Gopalakrishna et al., 2004). In a community
hospital in Toronto, in addition to droplet and contact precautions
and caring for SARS patients in airborne infection isolation ward,
healthcare workers wore double gloves, double gowns, goggles,
cap and shoe covers workers in the isolation ward, intensive care
unit and emergency room (Dwosh et al., 2003). In Kaohsiung, Tai-
wan, construction of standard negative-pressure isolation rooms
was expedited, and the emergency room was moved outside thehospital complex for patient triage (Liu et al., 2006). In a hospital
in Hong Kong, when the demand for personal protective equip-
ment was high in the outbreak setting, their provision to health-
care workers was stratiﬁed according to the risk of exposure to
SARS patients (Ho et al., 2003a).
In an effort to control nosocomial outbreaks, responses included
the temporary closure of wards (Gopalakrishna et al., 2004), outpa-
tient clinics (Liu et al., 2006), inpatient admission (Reynolds et al.,
2006), and both inpatient and outpatient services (Nishiura et al.,
2005; Varia et al., 2003). Home quarantine of healthcare workers
with SARS contact was also mandated in some centers (Dwosh
et al., 2003; Gopalakrishna et al., 2004). The median time between
admission of index patients and closure of hospital services was
18.5 days (range, 3–21 days), whereas the median time between
admission of index patients and termination of nosocomial out-
breaks of SARS was 30 days (range, 17–40 days) (Tables 4A–C).
However, it is still uncertain if the persistent detection of SARS-
CoV by RT-PCR in specimens from infected patients represented
live virus shedding and actually contributed to ongoing nosocomial
outbreaks (Chu et al., 2005b).
The largest nosocomial outbreak of SARS occurred in a teaching
hospital in Hong Kong (Lee et al., 2003). A total of 112 secondary
and 26 tertiary cases were epidemiologically linked to the 26-
year-old male index patient who presented to ward 8A on 4 March
2003. It was assumed that the use of nebulizer therapy for the in-
dex case might have contributed to the large number of secondary
cases, with an overall attack rate of SARS of 41% among hospital
inpatients (Yu et al., 2005). However, there was no detailed
description of outbreak control (Lee et al., 2003).
Retrospective on-site inspections, measurements of the venti-
lation design, air distribution system and bio-aerosol dispersion
were carried out in July 2003. The predicted bio-aerosol concen-
tration distribution in the ward seemed to agree fairly well with
the spatial infection pattern of SARS cases (Li et al., 2005b). Even
though the patient cubicles were in positive pressure with re-
spect to the corridor, the virus-containing bio-aerosols generated
Table 4A
Description of nosocomial outbreak of SARS and its infection control measures in Hong Kong and China.
City or
country
Hospital or
clinical
setting
Index patient Description of outbreak Infection Control measures Reference
Hong Kong 529-bed
community
hospital
2 febrile patients
admitted to ward
A on Mar 23
40 HCWs infected; mean age of
36 years; female 31 (77.5%)
At the end of Mar: segregation hospital into ultra-high-risk
areas (isolation rooms and ICU) and high-risk areas (medical
and pediatric wards) with provision of N95 respirators, gloves,
gowns, and eye shields; low-risk area (the rest of hospital)
with provision of surgical masks; Apr 14: two isolation wards
established for SARS patients; Apr 22: no new infection of
HCWs
(Ho et al.,
2003a)
Hong Kong University
afﬁliated
hospital
M/26 febrile
patient admitted
on Mar 4
112 secondary and 26 tertiary
cases (including 69 HCWs) linked
to the index patient
Not mentioned (Lee et al.,
2003)
Guangzhou University
afﬁliated
hospital
M/44 admitted
on Jan 30;
isolated after D2
of admission
35 secondary and 49 tertiary
cases, 81 of 84 cases were HCWs
Not mentioned (Wu et al.,
2004b)
D, day; ICU, intensive care unit.
Table 4B
Description of nosocomial outbreak of SARS and its infection control measures in Vietnam, Singapore, and Taiwan.
City or
country
Hospital
or clinical
setting
Index patient Description of outbreak Infection control measures Reference
Vietnam Private
hospital of
<60 bed
Index patient admitted
on Feb 26 to Mar 5
22 HCW infected from the index patient Mar 6: enhanced infection control practices,
cohorting of patients, and increased use of
barrier protections; Mar 12: N95 respirators,
goggles, and face shields were available to
staff; Mar 18: temporarily closure of hospital
(Reynolds et al.,
2006)
Vietnam 56-bed
secondary
care
hospital
Index patient admitted
on Feb 26; isolated after
D3 of admission
38 persons infected (at least 28 HCWs) Mar 8: Closure of all outpatient & inpatient
services, and HCWs advised not to return
home; Mar 11: dedicated ﬂoor to care SARS
patients with strict isolation; Apr 7: no more
transmission
(Nishiura et al.,
2005)
Singapore Public
tertiary
hospital
F/23 returned from visit
to Hong Kong, admitted
on Mar 1; isolated after
D5 of admission
23 secondary cases (including 13 HCWs)
from index patient; 49 tertiary cases
(including 31 HCWs)
End of ﬁrst week of Mar: provision of N95
respirators to HCWs when nursing index
patient and her contacts; end of second week
of Mar: practice of droplet precautions in ICU,
ER, and communicable disease wards; wearing
N95 respirators (Mar 22), gloves and gowns
(Apr 6), and goggles (Apr 25) for all patient
contact; Mar 22: no more transmission
(Teleman et al.,
2004)
Singapore 1400-bed
tertiary
hospital
Index patient admitted
on Mar 1; isolated after
D6 of admission
24 secondary cases (including 9 HCWs, 5
patients, and 10 visitors), and 25 tertiary
cases (including 12 HCWs, 4 patients, 8
visitors, and 1 household contact)
Mar 16: Screening & triage at ER, PPE (N95
respirators, gloves, gowns, and goggles if
dealing with suspicious cases; powered air
puriﬁed respirators for high-risk procedures
such as intubation) for staff in ER, ICU, and
isolation ward; Mar 22: closure of hospital, and
home quarantine of SARS contacts; Apr 8: full
PPE for HCW in all areas in hospital; Apr 12:
last case of nosocomial transmission
(Gopalakrishna
et al., 2004)
Singapore 1600-bed
tertiary
hospital
Index patient admitted
on Mar 24; isolated after
D9 of admission
13 HCWs as secondary cases and 47 tertiary
cases (including 11 HCWs, 11 patients, 2
outpatients, 12 visitors, and 11 household
contacts)
Apr 5: Transferal of exposed patients and
HCWs to the designated SARS hospital; Apr 8:
full PPE for HCW in all areas in hospital; Apr
15: last case of nosocomial transmission
(Gopalakrishna
et al., 2004)
Singapore A tertiary
hospital
Index patient admitted
on Apr 8; transferred to
designated hospital for
isolation on D2
6 secondary cases (including 3 HCWs, 2
inpatients, 1 visitor), and 3 tertiary cases
(inpatients)
Apr 11: closure of exposed wards for 10 days;
transferal of infected cases to the designated
SARS hospital; Apr 25: last case of nosocomial
transmission
(Gopalakrishna
et al., 2004)
Kaohsiung 2300-bed
medical
center
Index patient admitted
on Apr 26; isolated after
D4 of admission
55 secondary cases (52 probable and 3
suspected SARS) including 16 HCWs
Apr 30: wearing of N95 respirators in caring
index patient; May 1: screening patients for
possible SARS; May 11: expediting
construction of standard negative pressure
isolation rooms; May 16: cohorting patients
with probable and suspected SARS, closure of
outpatient clinics, moving ER to temporal
quarters outside for patient triage; May 26: last
case of nosocomial transmission
(Liu et al., 2006)
D, day; ER, emergency room; ICU, intensive care unit; PPE, personal protective equipment.
414 V.C.C. Cheng et al. / Antiviral Research 100 (2013) 407–419from the index patient’s cubicle were still transmitted to the
other cubicles. Using a computational ﬂuid dynamic simulation
test in a retrospective analysis, it was found that the air ex-change related to the small temperature differences between
cubicles might have contributed to SARS transmission (Chen
et al., 2011).
Table 4C
Description of nosocomial outbreak of SARS and its infection control measures in Canada.
City Hospital or
clinical setting
Index patient Description of outbreak Infection control measures Reference
Toronto 249-bed
secondary care
community
hospital with ER,
ICU, and CCU
Visitor to Hong Kong who
returned to Toronto on Feb 23
and infected her son who
admission on Mar 7
Secondary cases: 128 (72 probable, 56
suspected); mean age of 44.8 years;
female 77 (60.2%); HCWs 47 (36.7%); 17
patients died with an overall case-fatality
rate of 13.3%
Mar 13: Implementation of airborne,
contact and droplet precautions for
known cases of SARS; Mar 22: contact and
droplet precautions for all patients in ICU;
Mar 23: closed ER and ICU; Mar 24: closed
hospital admission & outpatient clinics;
use of gloves, gowns, N95 respirators, eye
protection and handwashing for all
patient care with outbreak control
(Varia
et al.,
2003)
Toronto 419-bed
community
hospital
M/77 admitted on Mar 16;
isolated after D13 of admission
14 secondary cases (including 10 HCWs
and 4 patients)
Mar 28: Implementation of droplet and
contact precautions and caring of SARS
patients in dedicated SARS ward with
negative pressure by dedicated medical
team; wearing double gloves, double
gowns, cap and shoe covers in ER, ICU, and
SARS ward; use of goggle in patient care
areas; voluntary quarantine of 10 days
from last exposure to the hospital
(Dwosh
et al.,
2003)
Toronto ICU of a hospital M/74 transferred to ICU on Mar
23; with the use of humidiﬁed
high-ﬂow oxygen (5 h), NIPPV
(18.25 h), and MV (7.5 h) before
isolation
7 (6 probable & 1 suspected cases) of 69
HCWs infected
Not mentioned (Scales
et al.,
2003)
CCU, coronary care unit; D, day; ER, emergency room; ICU, intensive care unit; MV, mechanical ventilation; NIPPV, noninvasive positive pressure ventilation.
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In view of the lack of effective antiviral therapy and vaccines,
infection control measures remain the most important modality
to prevent human-to-human transmission of SARS. Early isolation
of suspected patients is important to prevent nosocomial transmis-
sion (Chowell et al., 2003). In Hong Kong, patients triaged at the
emergency department and transferred from other hospitals were
evaluated using a set of clinical and epidemiological criteria, such
as fever over 38 C, cough, or shortness of breath, and with history
of close contact to SARS case. Patients fulﬁlling those criteria were
admitted to designated wards, where the number of beds in each
cubicle was reduced to allow a bed-to-bed distance of at least 2
meters, so as to minimize the risk of transmission (Ho et al.,
2003c). A dedicated team of physicians and nurses, led by experi-
enced respiratory and infectious disease experts, was established
to provide special care to all patients admitted to the designated
wards. Active surveillance of patients with community or nosoco-
mial acquired pneumonia was also conducted in general wards to
identify and isolate any unrecognized cases. Standard, contact, and
droplet precautions were enforced in all clinical areas in the
hospital.
Risk-stratiﬁed infection control measures were proposed in
acute pediatric wards in Hong Kong. By stratifying the clinical
areas into ultrahigh-, high- and moderate-risk areas, according to
different risk levels of nosocomial SARS transmission and the
implementation of different levels of infection control precautions,
there was no nosocomial transmission of SARS in the pediatric ser-
vice (Leung et al., 2004).
In Taiwan, an integrated infection control approach was imple-
mented at a SARS designated hospital where airborne infection iso-
lation rooms were not available. Fever screening stations, triage of
fever patients, separating SARS patients from other patients,
separation of entrances and passageways between patients and
healthcare workers, and increase of hand-washing facilities all
demonstrated a protective effect for healthcare workers (Yen
et al., 2011, 2006).
Besides the infection control preparedness in the emergency
department, triage areas, general wards, and designated SARSwards, special arrangements were also made for operating rooms.
For instance, reorganization of staff deployment was made to min-
imize the potential exposure of healthcare workers. Physical mod-
iﬁcation of the ventilation system was done to minimize the
outﬂow of contaminated air from the operating room into the rest
of the operating room complex. With these key arrangements, 41
operative procedures, including 15 high-risk procedures (surgical
tracheostomy), were performed on SARS patients by 124 health-
care workers in the operating room complex in Singapore, without
any transmission of SARS (Chee et al., 2004).
Because the viral load was relatively low during the initial
phase of symptoms (Peiris et al., 2003a), timely contact tracing of
exposed persons and quarantine were effective in the control of
SARS transmission in the community. In Beijing, extensive contact
tracing of over 30,000 persons for quarantine measures was carried
out in 2003. Among 2195 quarantined close contacts, the overall
attack rate of SARS was 6.3%, ranging from 15.4% among spouses
to 0.36% among work and school contacts. Without such measures,
SARS might have persisted in the community and hospitals (Pang
et al., 2003).
8. Lessons learned and the way forward
With the emergence of the MERS-CoV in the Middle East and
avian inﬂuenza A H7N9 infections in China, which are both associ-
ated with unusually high mortality rates (Chan et al., 2013a; Chan
et al., 2013b; Chan et al., 2012; Chan et al., 2013d; Chen et al.,
2013), it is time to consolidate what we have learnt from SARS
and adopt proactive infection control measures. Novel pathogens
may emerge from wild animals as a result of their close interac-
tions with humans in markets and restaurants. Besides the surveil-
lance of these animal sources (Lau et al., 2010; Poon et al., 2005a;
Wong et al., 2007), it is even more important to enhance our
clinical awareness for the early recognition of infection caused by
novel microbial agents. Appropriate infection control measures,
with provision of personal protective equipment and isolation of
patients, should be implemented early.
With the advancement of laboratory technologies, diagnostic
tests can be performed within a short period of time. In fact, we
416 V.C.C. Cheng et al. / Antiviral Research 100 (2013) 407–419have successfully implemented these actions during the outbreak
of pandemic inﬂuenza A H1N1 in 2009, thus preventing the occur-
rence of a nosocomial outbreak in our hospital (Cheng et al., 2010b;
Cheng et al., 2012b). Rapid laboratory diagnostic testing has been
integrated into proactive infection control measures against vari-
ous bacteria and viruses with the potential for nosocomial out-
breaks (Cheng et al., 2011b; Cheng et al., 2011c; Cheng et al.,
2012d). The introduction of sophisticated molecular and sequenc-
ing techniques has also facilitated our investigation of outbreaks
and pseudo-outbreaks caused by unusual pathogens (Cheng
et al., 2009a; Cheng et al., 2012c; To et al., 2013).
Because SARS affected a large number of healthcare workers
with fatalities (Cooper et al., 2009), their protection is an important
aspect of infection control training, in addition to patient safety.
Hand hygiene with the use of an alcohol-based hand rub has be-
come a key infection control measure. We have further promoted
hand hygiene by introducing a concept of directly-observed hand
hygiene and electronic monitoring of compliance (Cheng et al.,
2011a; Cheng et al., 2007b), resulting in better control of endemic
and sporadic pathogens in the hospital (Cheng et al., 2010a; Cheng
et al., 2009c). The concept of extensive contact tracing during the
SARS outbreak has been harnessed for the control of multiple
drug-resistant organisms which are not yet endemic in our health-
care setting (Cheng et al., 2009b; Cheng et al., 2012a). Ten years
after the SARS outbreak, our healthcare system is better prepared
for the new challenges posed by known and unknown emerging
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